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U.S.

GOVERNMENT RAISES THE BAR ON '"DEEMED

EXPORTS" AND CONTINUES OTHER TRADE RESTRICTIONS
Conan P Gral/1es* and Ten)' L. FlIlld**
Recently, the U.S. Government has taken a number of steps to tighten its
regulations on so-called deemed exports, a

pitt~t11

for companies who may not

even be in the exp0l1 business. A company can be engaged in a deemed export if
it allows certain foreign employees, who work in the U.S., to have access to
restricted technologies such as micro-processors and high-tech computers.
Many eompal1les arc not aware that the U.S. Commerce Department
regulates the export of certain types of mIcro-processors, computers and
computer software. The restrictions on such exports arc higher for some countries
than others. In addition, a U.S. company may have no exports at all, but if it
allows employees from eOllntries slIeh as China, Iran and India to have access to
restricted technology, the company is deemed to have exported that technology
to the employee's country unless the employees are U.S. citizens or permanent
residents (green card holders).
The Department of Commerce's Office of the Inspector General issued a
report last year in which it suggested additional changes to increase national
security, and the Bureau of Industry and Security is currently reviewing and
* Mr. (iramcs is thc chairman of Kirton & McConkie's International Law Practice Section. He
specializes in international commercial transactions and U.S. f(lreign trade control law. Mr. Grames was
f(Jr111erly a worldwide partner with Baker & McKenzie and Vice President and Senior Counsel. International.
for Bristol-Myers Squibb's worldwide operations. Mr. Grames received his B.;\. in Economics Irom the
University of Utah and his J.D. from Harvard Lm School.
** Mr. Fund is an attorney with Kirton & McConkie's International La\\' Practice Section. He works
with multinational clients on a variety of employment. market entry and corporate organization issues in
countries around the world. Mr. FUlld received his B.S. ill International Business Management hom Utah
Valley State College and his J.D. hom Brigham Young University's J. Reuben Clark Law School.
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taking comments on this report.' The repOli suggested, among other things, that
an individual's birth citi::ellship be considered for "dccmed export" purposes. 2
CUtTent standards require an employer to verify the current citizenship or
permanent residency of an employee before granting access to restricted
technology.
If the suggested changes are implemented, an employer could be
"exporting" restricted technology if it allowed an Iranian-born Canadian national
employee to have access to that restricted technology. However, this restriction
would likely not apply when the foreign born national has been granted U.S.
citizenship or permanent residency) A much-heightened level of scrutiny will be
required of employers, using or producing restricted technology, if the regulations are passed.
For example, paJiicipants

111

the developing commercial spaceflight

industry arc facing significant challenges from such regulations since mueh of
the technology involved is restricted.

A subcommittee of the U.S. House of

Representatives Science Committee recently held a hearing on these challenges
and heard testimony from principal players in the industry.4 Even London-based
Virgin Galactic otTicers testified that "uncertainty about licensing requirements
has prevented Virgin Galactic from viewing ... designs for the commercial spaee

I Export Licensing. 70 Fcd. Reg. 15607 (Mar. 2X, 20(5).
21d., at 15608.
3 Update on Rccent Foreign Trade Controls Ikvclopll1cnts: Syria, Interdiction Sotlware, Deemed
Exports, Mandatory AES and other Regulatory Changes, Covington & Burling Foreign Trade Controls Practice
Group Newsletter. April 2005 (on tile with author).
4 Douglas Jacobsen, CO/l//l/I'rcia! Si)(fcl'/lighl 11/I!IISIiT Facil1,!!. i:'xfJO/1 ("ol1lm! ISSIII'S, (April 25,
2(05) al http://www.djacobsenlaw.coll1/tradelawnews.htl1ll.
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vehicle that it intends to use .... [and has] prevented Virgin Galactic from placing
a formal order ... for the vehicles.")
Even for experienced exporters, the regulations on exports to eertain
countrics can represent a shifting minefield. For example, in light of rccent
developments, the sanctions against Iraq and Libya are now virtually gone, with
limited restrictions remaining against trading with or investing in those countries.
However, sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Sudan and Syria prohibit practically all
expOlis. In fact, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
recently published Syrian Sanctions Regulations.!' These regulations expand on
and reinforce the prohibition on exports and reexports already in place, in part by
making some prohibitions applicable regardless of whether the transaction
involves a U.S. person.

Limited sanctions are also in place against Angola,

Burma (Myanmar), Colombia, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the former Yugoslavia.
In spite of the removal of some Indian and Pakistani names, the list of
Specially Designated Nationals (SON) has grown to around 6,000. The SON list
contains names of individuals and entities that are known to be engaged in or
supportive of intemational terrorism, weapons trade, drug trade and other
sanctioned activities. The penalties for doing business with any SDN are severe
and often catch companies by surprise. For example, a French bank issuing a
letter of credit on behalf of an overseas purchaser could be on the list if it had

51d.
(, 31 CY.R. pI. 54~.
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deposits fi'om an SON in a third country. Any company engaged in foreign trade
is advised to confirm that its transactions do not involve an SON.
Not surprisingly, the Arab boycott of Israel is still alive and well.
Companies involved in foreign trade with Arab League nations must establish a
compliance program to ensure that no prohibited language occurs in any trading
documents. Commonly, letters of credit from those nations contain statements
that would restrict the parties from dealing with Israel. Accepting such language
can result in criminal and tax penalties for U.S. companies and their subsidiaries.
Finally, U.S. companies, executives and employees must continue to be
vigilant in avoiding violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. A
payment of "grease" or bribes overseas, even if made by an agent or distributor,
can result in criminal fines and imprisonment for U.S. "persons." In the event an
employee or officer is found personally guilty of a violation, the company cannot
pay the criminal fines on his or her behalf.
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